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Abstract: In many real-world applications of Machine Learning it is of paramount
importance not only to provide accurate predictions, but also to ensure certain levels of
robustness. Adversarial Training is a training procedure aiming at providing models that
are robust to worst-case perturbations around predefined points. Unfortunately, one of
the main issues in adversarial training is that robustness w.r.t. gradient-based attackers is
always achieved at the cost of prediction accuracy. In this paper, a new algorithm, called
Wasserstein Projected Gradient Descent (WPGD), for adversarial training is proposed.
WPGD provides a simple way to obtain cost-sensitive robustness, resulting in a finer
control of the robustness-accuracy trade-off. Moreover, WPGD solves an optimal transport
problem on the output space of the network and it can efficiently discover directions where
robustness is required, allowing to control the directional trade-off between accuracy and
robustness. The proposed WPGD is validated in this work on image recognition tasks
with different benchmark datasets and architectures. Moreover, real world-like datasets
are often unbalanced: this paper shows that when dealing with such type of datasets, the
performance of adversarial training are mainly affected in term of standard accuracy.
Keywords: Adversarial training, Artificial Intelligence, Cost-sensitive, Deep Learning,
Image Classification, Optimal Transport, Wasserstein
1. Introduction
Recent advancements in Deep Learning have lead to several breakthrough applica-
tions in many fields, like Computer Vision [24], Health-care [12], Industry 4.0 [29, 39],
Natural Language Processing [52], Speech Recognition [34] and Transportation [16].
A crucial requirement for many applications in these fields, is to have models that
do not have unexpected behaviors. However, Deep neural networks (DNNs), under
some circumstances do not satisfy this property.
Probably the main alarming behavior of DNNs [5, 26] for classification tasks is
that they are susceptible to adversarial perturbations, i.e., for example, in the context
of Computer Vision, modifications to the input image that although imperceptible
to the human eye cause the network to misclassify, confidently, the image [47].
These perturbations are easy to synthesize and they may even generalize across
different networks [32]. This suggests surprising vulnerabilities in these state-of-
the-art classifiers and it has resulted in a flurry of activities towards understanding
this phenomenon [14, 43], building robustness and defenses against it [18, 28], as
also discovering new attacks [3, 7, 35, 36]. Adversarial robustness is fundamental in
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many real-world applications; in important applications like autonomous driving [38]
and predictive maintenance [46], errors and faults have different priorities and
importance: for example, in autonomous driving, if a recognition system of an
autonomous car misclassifies a cat as a dog there should be reasonably no damage,
while, if a human is misclassified, that could lead to dramatic consequences.
Adversarial robustness is here defined as the accuracy of a given model evaluated
in the worst-case input around a prescribed neighbourhood. More informally, it
can be considered as the accuracy of the models in worst-case scenarios. In this
context, the most common and effective approach to enable robustness to adversarial
examples in DNNs is Adversarial Training [28], whose idea is to train a model with
these worst-case examples, called adversarial examples instead of using clean data,
ie. data measured either without error or with negligible error. Thus, it is training
procedure belonging to the class of minimax problems [40], in which a inner loop finds
the worst-case data point x? trough gradient ascent and the outer loop minimizes
the target loss on x?.
Unfortunately, adversarial robustness comes at the price of lower classification
accuracy on clean data: this trade-off has been demonstrated by various analyses [13,
49]. As argued above, an adversarially robust classifier with low accuracy is unlikely
to be used in practical applications require both. Although much efforts has
been devoted to theoretically understand robustness, its practical consequences in
industrial applications received few attention from the literature [20].
The present work aims at addressing the aforementioned issues with the following
contributions:
• it is shown that the quantitative and qualitative difference between robust
and standard models correlates with the visual metric of classes, ie. it is
aligned with the human notion of distance between classes. Adversarially
trained networks learn to (mostly) ignore fine-grained classification and
confuse classes with samples that are close to the decision boundaries. This
result is corroborated by [33] where it is shown that adversarial training
leads to boundaries with low curvature;
• it is shown that robust models are less confident in their predictions than
standard models are;
• inspired by the previous observation, Wasserstein Projected Gradient De-
scent (WPGD), an algorithm for adversarial training of deep networks,
is presented here. WPGD improves the efficiency of the inner loop in
gradient-based defenses such as Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). WPGD
formulates an optimal transport problem on the label space with the under-
lying metric given by the distances of the classification boundaries between
classes. This metric guides the search for adversarial perturbations towards
classes that are visually dissimilar. It is shown that training deep net-
works using WPGD is effective in shaping boundaries to maintain direction
robustness where required will maintaining accuracy on similar classes.
Moreover, it is worth noting that, although the experiments in this work regard
image recognition tasks, the WPGD framework can be easily extended to other
types of data such as time-series.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 the building blocks of the
proposed approach, estimating the distance to the boundaries and optimal transport,
are presented, while properties of adversarial training are discussed in Sec. 3. In
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Sec. 4 the WPGD algorithm is introduced and experimental results on MNIST [25],
CIFAR-10 and Tiny Imagenet datasets for different deep networks are reported.
Related works and discussion are provided in Sec. 6 and Sec. 7 respectively.
2. Notation and building blocks
This section describes the notation and the main building blocks of the approach
presented in this work.
Notation: Let θ ∈ Rd denote the parameters of a neural network. Input images
are denoted by X = {xi : i ≤ N} with pixel intensities normalized to lie between
[0, 1]. Given an image x, let κ(x) ∈ {1, . . . ,K} be its ground-truth label, the one-hot
encoding of κ(x) is denoted by y(x). The normalized probability distribution over
the classes as predicted by the network is denoted by ŷ(x) ∈ RK , here ŷ(x)k denotes
its kth entry and κ̂(x) = arg maxk ŷ(x)k is the predicted class. The cross-entropy
loss can then be written as
`CE(θ; x) = − log ŷ(x)κ(x) (1)
and training a network involves minimizing the average loss, ie. arg minθ Ex∼X
[
`CE(θ; x)
]
.
The training dataset is represented with D = {x,y}, where x = {xi}Ni=1 and
y = {yi}Ni=1 are, respectively, a set of randomly sampled data point and their
corresponding labels generated from a unknown distribution pψ(x, y), parametrized
by ψ. In lieu of minimizing the expected loss over the training data, adversarial
training solves
min
θ
EX
[
max
x′ ∈ M(x)
`CE(x
′; θ)
]
; (2)
this is a saddle point problem where, at each iteration, candidate images x′ are
chosen from a set M(x) (or a manifold). This has been a successful approach to
training neural networks robustly w.r.t. adversarial perturbations, see [28, 22, 44, 21].
In this paper only M(x) =M∞(x) = {x′ : ‖x′ − x‖∞ ≤ }, the infinity-norm ball
around x, is considered to obtain an algorithm based on PGD [6], [28].
It is remarked that the theoretical properties described in the following are
generally applied to general setting and not only Euclidean perturbations. In this
paper it is distinguished between natural error (NE) and adversarial error (AE) as
the errors obtained with natural images and with adversarial images, respectively.
In the following only `∞ is used for perturbations in all the experiments regarding
real datasets while `2
1 for perturbations in the synthetic example of Sec. 3.4.
3. Properties of adversarial training
In this Section some effects and properties of adversarial training on various
aspects are reported. Such aspects are:
• the qualitative and quantitative description of classification errors, measured
by the accuracy gap (Sec. 3.1);
• unbalanced classification problems (Sec. 3.2);
• the characterization of output confidence ( Sec. 3.3);
• the characterization of boundaries (Sec. 3.4).
1The reason for using `2 instead of `∞ is simply to ease visualization of the impact of adversarial
training.
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The aforementioned effects are supported by experiments reported in this Section.
Moreover, it is shown in Sec. 3.3 that an entropic regularization help in obtaining
robustness.
The properties and effects of adversarial training reported here have motivated
WPGD that will be presented in the following Section.
3.1. Accuracy gap. In order to ease the understanding of the results on this
Section, the notion of accuracy gap is defined as the following:
Definition 1. Let Cpgd and Cce be the confusion matrices of robust and standard
models, respectively. The accuracy gap G is defined as the absolute difference between
the confusion matrices:
G = |Cpgd − Cce|
Although it is known that robustness is obtained at cost of accuracy [28, 49], it
is not still clear in the literature whether this gap can be mitigated2. In this work a
first step into tackling this problem is taken by studying how errors are distributed
between images and classes: it is shown in the following that mis-classification errors
are distributed following the visual metric, meaning that robust networks tend to
destroy fine-grained classification. Qualitatively, the visual metric is a distance
between classes that can be easily interpreted by humans. One approach for defining
such visual metric is to employ the distance from boundaries of a deep neural
network: in fact, [42] showed that NNs learn representations that are well-aligned
with our idea of visual similarity.
Due to high-dimensionality of input, obtaining a good approximation of the
visual metric is not easily feasible. However, it can be replaced by the semantic
metric provided by WordNet [30], which is a good proxy for the visual metric as also
showed by [9]. For MNIST, it used a linear classifier on the input pixels whereby
the boundaries can computeed accurately.
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Figure 1. CIFAR-10 dataset. In panel (a) it is reported a matrix of pairwise distances
between classes. Classes are (top to bottom): airplane, car, bird, cat, deer, dog, frog,
horse, ship, truck. Panel (b) shows the accuracy gap between a Wide Residual Network
[53] trained using PGD and one trained with the standard cross-entropy loss.
2On MNIST dataset, high capacity networks reduce the accuracy gap to near zero. However, in
more complex datasets, such as CIFAR-10, this gap exists even with very large networks.
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Fig. 1 illustrates results for CIFAR-10. In particular, Fig. 1b shows the accuracy
gap between a Wide Residual Network [53] trained using PGD and one trained
with the standard cross-entropy loss. From this figure, it is easy to see a visual
correlation between metric and accuracy gap. Interestingly, the errors that are
explained by such metrics, correspond to classes which are visually similar. For
instance, Fig. 1 shows a gap on the pair bird-airplane which are visually similar
but semantically different. Analogously, in Fig. 2, Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 it is shown the
WordNet metrics and the relative accuracy gaps for MNIST, Tiny-Imagenet and
CIFAR-100, respectively. Similar results are identifiable also for these datasets. In
fact, regarding MNIST, not surprisingly, digits ”0” and ”1” hardly fool each other.
The most similar digits are ”4” and ”9”: in fact, a small manipulation of such digits
can be sufficient to make them indistinguishable. Also, regarding CIFAR-100, as an
example, from indices 8-11 there is an evident cluster composed by the classes man,
boy, woman and girl. Other very connected classes are bridge, skyscraper, house,
castle and road. Moreover, there are animals that are semantically different but
which are visually similar, such the couple 32-90 that are seal and otter respectively.
The bottom-right cluster represents flowers and plants.
In Table 1 a quantitative measure (supporting the aforementioned ’visual’ results)
of the correlation between accuracy gap and relative metric is provided. The
minus sign is due to the fact that confusion matrices and distances are inversely
correlated: when the values of diagonal increase of the confusion matrices, then
the distance between classes decreases, on average. For MNIST the correlation is
higher since an approximation of the actual visual metric has been used, while for
CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 the correlation is lower because some pairs, for example,
bird-airplane are semantically different. Moreover, it is remarked that with high
output dimension, the correlation decreases even when there are well-correlated
structures. The correlation between two random matrices in R200×200 is almost zero
in expectation.
MNIST CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 Tiny-
Imagenet
Correlation -0.88 - 0.65 -0.35 -0.22
Table 1. Correlation ρ between accuracy gap and relative metric for all the datasets.
Given these premises and observations, the following conjecture can be made:
when the number of classes is high than boundaries among similar classes becomes
more complex. Thus, as an ablation study, two 2-classes problems with the CIFAR-
10 dataset are reported in the following: the first problem is to distinguish classes
airplane (id: 0) and horse (id: 7) while the second is cat (id: 3) vs dog (id:
5). In Fig. 5 it is shown that even in simple settings, adversarial training affects
dramatically fine-grained classification.
3.2. Unbalanced classification. Although real-world datasets are long-tailed [11],
most of the experiments and theoretical findings on the accuracy-robustness trade-off
in the literature were performed with balanced datasets [50].
Through an experimental analysis, it is shown that when classes are unbalanced,
adversarial training can have dramatic effects on clean accuracy. For this analysis, the
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(a) MNIST Visual Metric
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Figure 2. MNIST dataset: Accuracy gap G between baseline model and PGD-trained
model with  = 20 Fig. 2b and  = 38 Fig. 2c. The gap in accuracy caused by PGD
training correlates with the visual metric. This causes the network to be less effective in
fine-grained classification.
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(c) Confusion matrix of robust
network.
Figure 3. Accuracy gap between baseline model and PGD-trained model with  = 8 for
Tiny-ImagetNet.
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Figure 4. Accuracy gap between baseline model and PGD-trained model with  = 8 for
CIFAR-100. The main cluster in the upper-left part of Fig. 4b identifies animals in general.
same 2-classes problems of the ablation study reported in subsection 3.1 are selected:
cat-vs-dog and airplane-vs-horse. Classes are artificially randomly unbalanced such
that their ratio is 0.3.
The cat-vs-dog classification problem is intrinsically difficult since the two classes
have many features in common. Moreover, CIFAR-10 have low-resolution images
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making (sometimes) this classification task not trivial also for human classifiers. On
the contrary, airplane-vs-horse is a simple task and thus one should expect that
adversarial training does not decrease much clean accuracy.
The results of these two experiments are shown in Fig. 5: two different considera-
tions are here reported. The first is that when classes are similar, as mentioned above,
PGD heavily impacts on the performance with respect to standard training. Instead,
for dissimilar classes, the effect is much less pronounced. This a solid argument for
supposing that using a single  may be not optimal. The second consideration is that
when dataset is unbalanced, PGD further amplifies the difficulty of the classification
task. For example, for cat-vs-dog (Fig. 5d), in presence of unbalance, the model
can’t be fit at all.
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(a) Standard training 0-vs-7.
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(b) Standard training 3-vs-5.
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(c) Unbalanced 0-vs-7.
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(d) Unbalanced 3-vs-5.
Figure 5. Panel (a) and Panel (b) report validation curves for the problems 0-7 and 3-5,
respectively. Panel (c) and Panel (d) are the same curves with a randomly unbalanced
dataset. For classes (3) and (5), when the dataset is unbalanced the validation error
remains constant to random choice (50%).
3.3. Entropy of softmax outputs. One of the issues of ’standardly’ trained
network, is that they are over-confident, that is, they tend to predict classes with
with high probability even when images are not clear [19]. Adversarial training can
be seen as an implicit regularization and thus it is legitimate to analyze confidence of
predictions on robust models. Indeed, in Fig. 7 it is shown that another characteristic
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Figure 6. CIFAR-10. Comparison of t-SNE computed on the representation of standard
models (left) and robust models (right). Each coloured cluster correspond to one particular
class.
of adversarial training is reducing confidence of predictions; in fact, the entropy
of class logits of the robustly trained network is much higher. This suggests that
confidence scores obtained by thresholding the softmax predictions should be changed.
Thus, it may seems that robust representations are less discriminative than standard
ones. 3 It turns out that this intuition is true and supported by Fig. 6. In order to
assess the structure of representations, it has been employed t-SNE [27], a techniques
that allows to visualize high-dimensional data in 2 or 3 dimensions. From Fig. 6, it
is clear that robust representations are less clustered with respect to natural ones.
Each coloured cluster correspond to one particular class.
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Figure 7. Entropy histograms of prediction confidence for W-16-10 with  = 8 of class
airplane. Robust networks provide more conservative predictions. Adversarial training
prevents the network to provide high confidence predictions. This is a consequence of
simplifying boundaries as shown in Sec. 3.4. Other classes follow the same trend.
3.4. PGD flattens boundaries. In order to better understand the behavior of
PGD and also to compare it with WPGD defined in Sec. 4, a simple classification
problem with three classes is considered. Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 show the boundaries
for PGD and WPGD (for different ), respectively. Fig. 8a represents the standard
training with which achieves almost zero error. As  increases boundaries are more
3For those who are not used to deep learning language, in this context a representation is the
vector (output of the feature extractor) that is feed to the last layer which is a linear classifier.
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flattened as orthogonal as possible to the gradient direction. The adopted cost
matrix is C =
 0 10 0.0110 0 1
0.01 1 0
. Related this results, [33] showed experimentally
that the main effect of PGD is to reduce the curvature of boundaries. However, it can
be easily shown that even when the curvature is, robust training still has an effect.
Moreover, it is noticed that gradients are more aligned to the vector which connect
two classes. This is due to the ”isotropic” effect of PGD which tend to estimate more
isotropic distributions. This is in accordance with [50] in which authors observed
that gradient on the robust model are more meaningful. This argument is also in
accordance to results on fine-grained classification present on this work, suggesting
that visually similar are separated by more complex boundaries. Instead, WPGD
controls the the regularization of boundaries through the cost matrix: boundaries
for couple of classes considered more similar are mostly preserved.
(a) Original problem
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(b) PGD ( = 0.2)
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(c) PGD ( = 0.4)
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(d) PGD ( = 0.8)
Figure 8. Effect of robust `2-training on a simple classification problem. PGD training
flattens the boundaries.
Remark 2. One may find the claim that since visually similar are separated by
more complex boundaries, it obviously hurts robustness. However, the range of values
of  used for robust training are much smaller than the minimal distance between
two images in the dataset. Thus, at least in principle, it is not still clear why it is
not possible to obtain robustness and accuracy at the same time.
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(a) Original problem
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(b) WPGD ( = 0.2)
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(c) WPGD ( = 0.4)
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(d) WPGD ( = 0.8)
Figure 9. Effect of directional robust `2-training on a simple classification problem.
WPGD flatten the boundaries where the cost is low and preserve them where the cost is
high.
4. Wasserstein Projected Gradient Descent
Sec. 4.1 briefly reviews the the necessary background on discrete Optimal transport
tools, while Sec. 4.2 introduces a new formulation of directional adversarial training.
4.1. Wasserstein metric and optimal transportation. The cost between classes,
referred to as label metric, is defined in the following:
Definition 3 (Label metric C p). A symmetric positive semi-definite matrix
C ∈ RK×K+ defines a pseudo-Riemannian metric on the domain, an entry Ck,k′ is
the cost of transporting unit probability mass from class k to class k′. Note that
Ck,k = 0. The notation C
p denotes the element-wise pth-power of C.
The other building blocks are the optimal transportation problem [41] and the
Wasserstein metric over probability distributions. Given two probability distributions
q, q′ supported on K classes, the p-Wasserstein distance between q and q′ for
p ∈ [1,∞) is defined to be
Wpp (q, q
′) = inf
pi ∈ Π(q,q′)
〈
pi, C p
〉
(3)
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where Π(q, q′) =
{
pi ∈ RK×K+ : q = pi1, q′ = pi>1
}
is the set of joint probability
distributions with q as the right marginal and q′ as the left marginal; 1 denotes
the all-one vector and 〈·, ·〉 is the Frobenius inner product on matrices. The
Wasserstein distance is the optimal cost of transporting probability mass from
an initial distribution q to a final distribution q′. For 0 < p ≤ 1, the Wasserstein
distance in (3) is defined to be Wp (q, q
′) = infpi ∈ Π(q,q′) 〈pi, C p〉; note the absence
of pth power on the left-hand side. For any separable complete metric space (X , d)
and p > 0, the metric space (Pp,Wp) is complete and separable, Pp being the set of
probability distributions supported on X [2].
Problem (3) is called the Kantorovich relaxation [41] of the original optimal
transport problem with Π = RK×K+ [31] and it takes O(K3) operations to solve
it using linear programming or interior point methods. [8] proposed a smoothed
alternative to (3) by adding a convex negative entropic term
λWpp (q, q
′) = inf
pi∈Π(q,q′)
〈
pi,C p
〉− λ−1H(pi), (4)
H(pi) = −∑Kk,k′=1 pik,k′ log pik,k′ that enables an efficient algorithm based on Sinhorn-
Knopp iteration [45] to approximate pi∗. Large values of λ give better approximation
to the exact distance Wpp and it can be shown that
λWpp converges to W
p
p as
λ→∞ [37].
Sinhorn-Knopp iteration is a costly algorithm if the number of classes K is large
or the metric C p is complex. However as the following lemma shows, if one of the
probability distributions is a one-hot vector, one can compute the optimal transport
pi∗ in closed form. Indeed, in this paper, the p-Wasserstein distance is computed
between the ground-truth y(x) and the network predictions ŷ(x), the former being
a one-hot vector.
Lemma 4 (Closed-form Wasserstein distance). For any normalized q, if the
target probability distribution q′ is a one-hot vector, the Wasserstein distance Wpp
can be computed in closed form and is given by
Wpp(q, q
′) = C pκ∗ q
where κ∗ = arg maxk q
′. The optimal transport is such that its (κ∗) th column is q.
The proof of this lemma follows from the observation that the set Π(q, q′) is
degenerate for one-hot q′, the constraints pi>1 = q′ and pi1 = q force the (κ∗) th
column of pi to be simply q. Note that the Wasserstein distance is symmetric
and therefore the same statement holds for Wpp(q
′, q). Finally, the regularized [8]
Wasserstein Loss is defined as follows:
Definition 5 (Wasserstein Loss). The Wasserstein Loss can now be defined as
`W(θ; x) = C
p
κ(x) ŷ(x)−
λ−1
logK
H(ŷ(x)); (5)
here C py(x) denotes the y(x)
th row of the matrix C p ∈ RK×K+ . Note that computing
`W(θ;x) and back-propagating through it has the same computational complexity as
standard cross-entropy.
4.2. WPGD. The saddle point formulation for the Wasserstein loss (5) can be
modified to lead to the following definition.
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Definition 6 (Robust Wasserstein loss). The Robust Wasserstein loss is defined
as
min
θ
EX `CE(x∗; θ), x∗ = arg max
‖x′−x‖∞≤
`W(θ; x
′) (6)
The outer loop remains the same while the inner loop is responsible to find the
adversarial example which maximize the Wasserstein loss `W. This implies that at
the beginning of training WPGD will prefer directions connecting visually distant
classes, such as, cat and truck, preventing to flatten regions between similar classes.
It is important to note that during training there is an implicit trade-off between
choosing directions suggested by the metrics and gradients directions. In fact, the
loss gradient is nothing else that an inner product of the K logit’s gradients and the
the row k-th row of C. Imposing an approximation of the real visual metric, helps
to efficiently explore the `∞-ball which, especially for high-dimensional input can
be hard to explore, leading to better results. For WPGD experiments, the metrics
previously described will be used.
5. Experiments
This Section provides the experimental findings of the WPGD approach.
5.1. Datasets and networks. In this paper, the MNIST [25], CIFAR-10, CIFAR-
100 datasets [23] and Tiny-ImagetNet [1] dataset are used for the experiments. For all
datasets, images are normalized to have pixel intensities between [0, 1]. The adversar-
ial vulnerability of neural networks increases with the number of output classes [13].
In this context, is it worth emphasizing that the Tiny-ImagetNet dataset with 200
classes is a viable dataset for benchmarking adversarial learning algorithms; this
dataset is however less popular in the literature which primarily focuses on MNIST
and CIFAR-10. For the CIFAR datasets, it is used standard data-augmentation
which involves mirror flipping with probability of 0.5 and random crops of size
32× 32 after padding images by 4 pixels on each side. The following networks are
used in all the experiments:
(i) W-16-10: Wide-Residual network of [53] with 16 layers, a widening factor
of 10, weight decay of 5× 10−4 and zero dropout.
(ii) W-40-10: Wide-Residual network of [53] with 50 layers, a widening factor
of 10, weight decay of 5× 10−4 and zero dropout.
(iii) W-28-10: Wide-Residual network of [53] with 28 layers, a widening factor
of 10, weight decay of 5× 10−4 and zero dropout.
All networks are trained with stochastic gradient descent (SGD), Nesterov’s mo-
mentum of 0.9 and mini-batch size of 128.
5.2. Algorithms. The following four algorithms will be compared:
(i) CE: This is the standard cross-entropy loss `CE defined in (1).
(ii) PGD: This is the algorithm of [28]; the saddle-point problem (2) is solved
with 8 steps in the inner loop to compute the adversarial image.
(iii) WPGD: This is the robust Wasserstein loss described in Def. 6 where the
inner loop in PGD searches over the adversarial image that maximizes the
Wasserstein transport cost. The computational complexity of WPGD is
the same as that of PGD. WPGD is compared with three different value of
p = 1, 2.5, 10.
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W-s-10 represents the wideresnet architecture with s layers. In order to test
robustness, 20-steps PGD attacks are performed starting from a random (uniformly
sampled) position inside the `∞ ball of the test image x. All the WPGD experiments
are run with the cost matrix provided by the WordNet metric [30].
5.3. Directional robustness of WPGD. In Table 2 the main results of natural
training (CE) and robust training (PGD) for CIFAR-10 and Tiny-ImagetNet are
reported. Sec. 5.4 reports a summary table for quantitative results on directional
robustness. Instead, in Fig. 10 it is shown the trade-off arising from WPGD training.
As p increases, fine-grained classification is more preserved. In addition to standard
accuracy, the characterizations of adversarial robustness of PGD and WPGD is
compared. In Fig. 11 it shown that WPGD-trained networks with a strong metric
tend to be more robust between visually distant classes, which supports out claims.
For sake of clarity, only results for CIFAR-10 and Tiny-ImagetNet and W-16-10 are
reported. Interestingly, WPGD is less robust than PGD for classes bird and airplane:
thus, imposing a metric, even if it is only approximately correct, seems to help to
obtain more visually meaningful errors.
C10 CE PGD
16-10 28-10 16-10 28-10
NE 4.4 3.9 14.11 13.9
AE 100 100 34.5 31.25
Tiny CE PGD
16-10 28-10 16-10 28-10
NE 37.7 36.9 55.3 36.9
AE 99.9 100 70.4 70.5
Table 2. Summary of errors in [%] for W-16-10 and W-28-10, with  = 4 and k = 20
under `∞ perturbations.
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Figure 10. Accuracy & robustness trade-off: Results for W-16-10 and  = 4, for CIFAR-
10 (left) and Tiny-ImagetNet (right). Increasing p (x-axis), enables to improve accuracy
on fine-grained classification at the price of robustness on pairs of similar classes
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Figure 11. CIFAR-10. Characterization of adversarial robustness for WPGD and PGD
defenses. Applied perturbations have norm  = 16 on W-28-10. WPGD is performed
using p = 2.5. Fig. 11b shows the WPGD obtains directionally robustness: in this case the
network is more robust for perturbations between two visually different classes.
5.4. Supplementary comparisons for CE, PGD and WPGD. Fig. 12 report
curves plot for PGD and WPGD for CIFAR-10 and Tiny-ImagetNet. Moreover, Ta-
ble 3 reports the summary of weighted robustness score S defined as:
S =
∑
i,j
ci,jmi,j (7)
where M = {mij}Ki,j=1 is the adversarial confusion matrix, C = {cij}Ki,j=1 is the
metric of the given dataset. Attacks are computed maximizing the loss (6), that is
considering the worst-case scenario in which the attacker knows the metric. This
score weighs more errors in correspondence of high cost. In order to make results
legible, the zero reference is set to the PGD-trained model. As it can be seen
increasing p, results in reducing the score S, which means that, on average, more
similar classes are reached.
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Figure 12. CIFAR-10. Comparisons: (Left) standard training vs PGD; (Middle) different
architectures on robust training; (Right) PGD vs WPGD. WPGD is slightly better in
terms of accuracy.
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Figure 13. Tiny-ImagetNet. Comparisons: (Top) standard training vs PGD; (Middle)
different architectures on robust training; (Bottom) PGD vs WPGD. WPGD is slightly
better in terms of accuracy.
AE [%] p dataset S
W-16-10 34.53 0.0 CIFAR-10 -0.14
W-16-10 34.62 1.0 CIFAR-10 -0.26
W-16-10 34.98 2.5 CIFAR-10 -0.34
W-16-10 39.76 10.0 CIFAR-10 -0.53
W-28-10 31.24 0.0 CIFAR-10 0.00
W-16-10 70.23 1.0 Tiny-ImagetNet -6.33
W-16-10 73.61 2.5 Tiny-ImagetNet -12.45
W-16-10 92.62 10.0 Tiny-ImagetNet -55.17
W-28-10 69.84 1.0 Tiny-ImagetNet -9.62
W-28-10 69.69 0.0 Tiny-ImagetNet -9.48
Table 3. Summary of weighted robustness score S defined in (7) for  = 4. In order to
make results more legible, the zero reference (for each dataset) is set to the PGD-trained
model. As it can be seen, increasing p results in reducing the score S, which means that,
on average, more similar classes are reached.
6. Related work
This work is related to [28, 48]. Although they give theoretical and practical results
on the connection between robustness and accuracy for adversarial training, they
don’t analyze how the accuracy gap is distributed. They also argue that adversarial
training requires extra capacity in order to build complex boundaries [22]. In
contrast, [33] have recently argued that adversarial training leads to flatter decision
boundaries and in fact, explicitly penalizing the curvature of the decision boundary
is a good technique to train robust classifiers. Results in this paper corroborate
these findings. The accuracy gap of adversarially trained networks with respect to
standard cross-entropy trained networks can be explained, very well the experiments
show, by the network getting these pairs of classes incorrect. Semantic metrics,
e.g., those derived from WordNet [30] to aid visual classification have been popular
to introduce a new data-modality in standard supervised learning [9, 10]. This
paper identifies the inherent visual metric that the network induces while being
trained using cross-entropy loss or the adversarial loss. Lastly, using an optimal
transport formulation to impose a metric on the label space of deep networks
bears close resemblance to the work of [15]. This work uses the Wasserstein loss
computed using the Sinhorn-Knopp iteration to predict multi-label images. The
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present paper is the first to use the optimal transport formulation to induce a
cost-sensitive adversarial training of deep networks. Further, for single-label images,
it shown that the optimal transport problem has a closed form solution which
makes it computationally equivalent to the cross-entropy loss; this simple but
powerful property may be of independent interest for problems like hierarchical
classification [17, 51, 4].
7. Conclusions and future work
While the literature on adversarial training is flourishing, profound studies towards
understanding its implication and sensitivity to common real-world applications
are still lacking. In particular, this paper focused on applications that are cost-
sensitive or the dataset is unbalanced. Moreover, due to an intrinsic trade-off
between robustness and accuracy, it is of paramount importance to be to govern
such trade-off when designing and implementing machine and deep learning-based
applications where a certain amount of accuracy is required. In liue of this, the
present paper made several advances towards understanding better robustness from
one side and being able to semantically control it from the other side.
In particular, this paper identified that the accuracy gap in adversarial training
comes from the loss of fine-grained classification capabilities in neural networks. This
observation motivates the optimal transport formulation: a metric on the label space
that measures the distance to the boundary for standard cross-entropy training or,
often equivalently, a semantic metric obtained from external data modalities such as
WordNet, reduces the search space and makes it easier to discover—and fix—these
classes during adversarial training, resulting in an improvement of accuracy at the
cost of (directional) robustness. It is conceivable that, although a high-dimensional
classifier may always remain vulnerable to adversarial perturbations, it is possible
to build robust, real-world systems by incorporating such diverse data. Thus, this
work is a first step toward a principled robust training for real-world applications
involving artificial intelligence and deep learning.
Future works will regard the study of methodologies or heuristics to systematically
control the robustness-accuracy trade-off without the need of tuning  by hyper-
parameter tuning. Moreover, another future direction of research is the application
of the WPGD approach to other problems like fraud detection and Predictive
Maintenance.
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